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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann., Sec.78-2-3(j), (2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
In this case, Appellee (de Groot) billed Appellants (Gallachers) for a balance owed 
upon a building contract, and received no response, then timely filed a mechanics lien for the 
balance owed. The contract signed by the parties referred all disputes arising out of the 
contract to arbitration, but never waived in any way, deGroot's rights under Utah's 
mechanics lien statutes or the attorneys fees provided thereunder. The contract was totally 
silent as to mechanics liens and attorneys fees. DeGroot gave notice of this lien to 
Gallachers, as required by law for the recovery of attorneys fees under Sec. 38-1-18 Utah 
Code Ann., and still no payment or any other response was made by Gallacher. DeGroot 
then filed an action for the balance owed plus attorneys fees and to foreclose de Groot9 s 
mechanics lien for that sum upon the real property. The matter was referred to an arbitrator 
and de Groot thereafter obtained an arbitration award of about eighty five percent of its claim 
made in the mechanics lien claim; but the arbitrator ruled that each party had to bear its own 
attorneys fees. Did deGroot commit an act of bad faith by moving the trial court to award 
attorneys fees under Sec. 38-1-18, Utah Code Ann. for the attorneys fees and costs 
necessarily incurred by de Groot in recording the mechanics lien and filing the action and 
for the attorneys fees incurred in the arbitration which then occurred to determine the amount 
owed to deGroot and to be foreclosed under the mechanics lien statutes? In the alternative, 
did the trial court breach its discretion in refusing to grant Gallacher attorneys fees for the 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
post arbitration motions filed by deGroot? 
The standard of appellate review of refusal by a trial court to find bad faith on the part 
of a party, is whether or not the trial court was "clearly erroneous" in its decision. Warner 
v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT102, 20P3rd868, 874. (Utah 2000/ The standard of review 
as to a refusal by a trial court to award fees under Sec. 78-3 la-16 (1985) is whether or not 
the trial court breached its very broad discretionary powers under that statute, as the word 
"may"is used as to whether or not a party will be awarded attorneys fees by the court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Section 38-1-18, Utah Code Annotated: 
"Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, in any action brought to enforce 
any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorneys'fee to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs 
in the action." 
Section 78-31 a-16, Utah Code Annotated: 
"An award which is confirmed, modified, or corrected by the court shall be 
treated and enforced in all respects as a judgment. Costs incurred incident 
to any motion authorized by this chapter, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee, unless precluded by the arbitration agreement, may be awarded by the 
Court." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
DeGroot, at the request of the defendant, R.T. Gallacher Investments, LLC, 
constructed a house in Park City, Utah, which was owned by the defendant Richard 
Gallacher. DeGroot claimed a balance due of $9,881.83, and billed Mir Gallacher with 
various invoices which Gallacher failed to pay (R.37-35). DeGroot then recorded a 
2 
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mechanics lien for that amount and sent a true copy of this lien to the defendant Richard 
Gallacher by certified mail, return receipt requested, as required by Sec. 38-1-18 Utah Code 
Ann. (Complaint R.4-1 and Arbitrators Findings, R. 53) neither Mr. Gallacher, or R.T. 
Gallacher LLC. responded in any way to deGroot's billings to them for the balance due, 
or the notice of the mechanics lien. Plaintiff then filed a mechanics lien foreclosure action 
in order to perfect and foreclose its lien and to collect the balance due, plus attorneys fees 
pursuant to Sec. 38-1-18 Utah Code Ann. (R.4-1). The defendants, after being served, 
responded with a motion to arbitrate and the plaintiff requested arbitration. 
The arbitration agreement made no mention of mechanics liens or the entitlement to 
attorneys fees under the mechanics lien statutes, or attorneys fees in any respect, but 
provided: 
"15.8 All claims or disputes between the Contractor and the Owner arising out 
of or relating to the Contract Documents or the breach thereof, shall be 
decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association....The award 
rendered by the arbitrator or arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may 
entered upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court having 
jurisdiction thereof.,?(R. 12-11) 
The arbitrator, after a two day hearing, made findings and an award to Plaintiff in the 
total sum of $8,636.43 plus one-half of the $500.00 administrative fee paid by plaintiff, and 
interest at 10 percent per annum(R. 56 - 34), and made the ruling that each party was to bear 
their own attorneys fees.(R. 49). Plaintiff then moved for the Entry of Judgment Based upon 
Arbitration Award and moved the court to Award Attorneys Fees or in the alternative, have 
the Arbitrator make findings as to which party was the successful party in the arbitration. 
3 
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(R33-25). The court sent the case back to the Arbitrator for clarification of his ruling, 
refusing to ask the arbitrator who was the "prevailing party". The Arbitrator then correctly 
concluded that the matter of attorneys fees under the mechanics lien statute was for the 
court to decide, as the Agreement made no provision as to attorneys fees. DeGroot then 
moved the court to award attorneys fees, as the successful party under the mechanics lien 
statute and the court denied this motion . DeGroot appealed this decision to this Court; 
however, after several stipulations for extension had been given, at a time beyond the last 
stipulation could not obtain a stipulation of extension of time in which to file the brief from 
Gallachers' counsel, leaving only this cross appeal for attorneys fees by Gallacher. 
Gallacher had requested attorneys fees for the post arbitration motions, which the lower court 
denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
The parties signed the Agreement (Appendix A, Appellant's brief) to construct a 
house in Park City, Utah. The Agreement was silent as to attorneys fees in the event of 
failure to pay on the part of Appellants (Gallachers). All disputes arising out of the contract 
documents were to be referred to arbitration, as above recited. DeGroot billed Gallachers, 
with no response, timely filed a mechanics lien, sent a true copy thereof to Gallachers by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, still receiving no response, deGroot filed a mechanics 
lien foreclosure action for the amount due plus attorneys fees under the mechanics lien 
statutes as set forth in the Statement of the Case, Supra., with the result that the matter was 
4 
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referred to an Arbitrator, who awarded deGroot about 85% of what it claimed owed. 
DeGroot then moved the lower court to enter the award as a judgment in the foreclosure case 
and to award attorneys fees as provided for in Sec.38-1-18, Utah Code Ann. 
One of the provisions of the Arbitrator5 s award was that both parties were to bear their 
own attorneys fees (R.49). In the first memo of law to the court, (R.31-28 and Appellees 
Appendix, pp.31 -28) deGroot pointed out that the original ruling by the Arbitrator that "each 
party was to bear its own attorneys fees" was beyond the power of the Arbitrator, because 
the Agreement signed by the parties was totally silent as to attorneys fees, and did not make 
any mention of any of the mechanics lien statutory rights, including attorneys fees, thus 
should not have been considered or fuled upon by the arbitrator. (R.84) The trial court sent 
the matter back to the arbitrator for clarification of his ruling and the arbitrator concluded 
that the reason that he made such a ruling was that the contract between the parties was 
silent as to attorneys fees and further, Sec. 38-1-18 Utah Code Ann. provides that attorneys 
fees are to be "fixed by the court", not the arbitrator.(R104) . 
Up to that point, deGroot agreed with the arbitrator's second decision. However, the 
Arbitrator, again exceeded his authority by further ruling "...any attorneys fees to be 
awarded in the dispute between the parties would be those incurred in connection with the 
court proceeding to foreclose the mechanics lien...". (R104) Such a decision could be 
construed to limit the attorneys fees incurred by deGroot to only the time spent in filing the 
mechanic's lien and filing the action, but not the time spent in pursuing the issue of 
determining the amount to be foreclosed in the action, a necessary prerequisite to foreclosing 
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the mechanics lien. Accordingly, deGroot objected to this part of the Arbitrator's second 
ruling, as the Arbitrator had no power in fact or in law to make such a decision Pacific 
Development v. Ortom 2000 Ut. 36, 23 P3rd 1035, 1039-40, Utah 2001} (Rl 12-110 and 
Appellant's Appendix). 
DeGroot further pointed out to the lower court in the second motion, that the general 
rule in the United States is that even though no attorney's fees are mentioned in an arbitration 
agreement, attorneys fees expended during arbitration proceedings required to determine the 
amount to be foreclosed in a mechanics lien proceeding should be awarded under the 
mechanic's lien statutes where requested by the prevailing party and cited to the court the 
secondary and case law supporting this rule (Rl 10). Accordingly, deGroot moved the trial 
court to award all of the attorneys fees and court costs incurred by it pursuant to Sec. 38-1-
18, Utah Code Ann. because it was indisputably the successful party in the arbitration 
proceeding, which was necessary to bring the mechanic's lien case to a conclusion (Rl 14-
101). 
In the meantime, the Gallachers never paid any money upon the arbitrator's award 
rendered on July 9,2001 (R.55), until March 8,2002 (R. 115), after deGroot's second motion 
to award attorneys fees, some eight months after the award, and even then, failed to pay the 
one-half of the initial arbitration filing fee awarded by the Arbitrator. 
In reply to deGroot's citation of authority in favor of awarding attorneys fees to a 
prevailing party in pursuing arbitration hearings in connection with a mechanic's lien 
foreclosure where requested, Gallachers failed to cite to the lower court one case or other 
6 
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"THE COURT: I do understand the argument Mr. Call but I think this is in 
many ways, first impression. I can certainly not find bad faith and I think it's 
a very reasonable argument that the mechanics lien has some independent 
enforceability here. I disagreed with it. It's applicability except if there's 
further action under the lien once we have an arbitration award. But the first 
time you were up here the arbitrator really hadn't addressed the issue. The 
second time. I think he did a very good job and I certainly agree with what he 
said but I do not find a basis for fees. I find that the statute is discretionary 
and the Court's discretion is appropriately exersized in this case by 
confirming the award and yet again, if I need to, but not awarding fees either 
way. That will be the order.femphasis added¥Op.Cit.p. 15) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
DeGroot has consistently taken the position that by signing an arbitration agreement 
which does not mention mechanics liens or the attorneys fees provided thereunder, it did not 
waive its statutory rights to file a mechanics lien and proceed to collect the money due, plus 
attorneys fees. While Utah has not ruled on this issue, other states courts have ruled that the 
attorneys fees necessary to determine the amount due a claimant in arbitration is a necessary 
part of the mechanics lien foreclosure procedure and are assessable as costs to the prevailing 
party under the statutory procedures for mechanics liens. 
8 
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ARGUMENT 
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an arbitration in order to arrive at the sum owed to the claimant in order to complete the 
mechanics lien foreclosure proceeding.(R.110). Gallacher, in their memorandum in 
opposition to this motion, argue only the language of Sec. 78-3 la-15(1) Utah Code Ann.> 
and the terms of the contract, neither of which deal with the issue of mechanics liens and 
the attorneys fees provided thereunder, to argue that deGroot waived his rights to a 
mechanics lien and the attorneys fees therein provided by signing an agreement that never 
mentions in any way, any such issues. Never once in any of the memos in the lower court, 
did Gallachers cite any case law from Utah or any other jurisdiction which held that such a 
contract waived the contractors statutory lien rights and attorney fees. In addition, on this 
appeal, no case authority is cited by Gallacher from any jurisdiction ruling in their favor that 
an arbitration agreement totally silent as to attorneys fees or mechanics liens bars a claimant 
from asking the court to award the fees provided for by mechanics lien statutes, where the 
claimant has perfected its lien and is the prevailing party. 
The ruling of the lower court (P.13, Tr., April 18, 2002, also at Appendix F, 
Appellant's brief) shows what it thought of the issues raised by the parties. Essentially, it 
had heard deGroot's arguments, Gallacher9 s arguments, and found that deGroot's counsel 
had never argued "about the underlying award" as Gallacher claims. The court went on: 
"It is very much the interplay of the mechanics lien statute which I think is a very legitimate 
legal point." It is obvious from this ruling that the lower court never felt that deGroot's 
motions were, in any way, an attack upon the Arbitration award, as Gallacher argued then 
and now on this appeal. The court went on at p. 15 of this transcript, to find no Bad Faith on 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the part of deGroot, and lo explain why there were two motion hearings, which was because 
the Arbitrator had failed to deal iwooeirlh mill Jllottieys, Ux\ in (be Award 
"THE COURT: I do understand the argument Mr, Call but I think this is in 
many ways, first impression. I can certainly not find bad faith and I think it's 
a very reasonable argument that the mechanics lien has some independent 
enforceability here. I disagreed with it. It's applicability except if there's 
further action under the lien once we have an arbitration award. But the first 
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had not properly dealt with attorneys fees upon the first motion; the Arbitration award had 
to be clarified. Upon the clarification, the second motion asked for attorneys fees to be 
awarded upon the basis of the mechanics lien statute, not modification of the arbitration 
award, which motion was denied by the lower court. There was no bad faith to be found 
upon these facts. The Arbitration statute is purely discretionary as to awarding attorneys 
fees for either party, and the lower court exercised its discretion and awarded neither party 
attorneys fees. Cross- Appellants have shown no valid reason in fact or law to overturn the 
decision of the lower court. 
Dated this 30th day of June, 2003. 
12 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delrvi'ird Iw pirs ol (IR ;ibu\i ,unl loiifjomg 
Cross-Appellees brief to John Call, Esq. At 333 North 300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
on the 30th day of June, 2003. 
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APPENDIX 
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No.. 
JOHN L. MCCOY (2164) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 W. Broadway, Suite #310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-6400 
FAX NO.: (801) 596-2336 
By. 
FILED 
AUG * 8 2001 
iniro ui*tHwi wourt £b Deputy Clerk, Summit County 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL deGROOT BUILDING SERVICES, 
LLC, Plaintiff , 
vs. 
RICHARD T. GALLACHER and R.T. 
GALLACHER INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT BASED ON ARBIT-
RATION AWARD AND MOTION 
TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES 
CIVIL NO. 000600252 
JUDGE: Hilder 
The plaintiff moves the Court pursuant to Section 78-
31a-15 U.C.A., to make findings as to which party was the 
'"successful party'' in the arbitration below and make a finding as 
to the reasonable fees to be awarded pursuant to Section 38-1-18 
U.C.A, or remand this case to the arbitrator to make findings 
pursuant to Section 38-1-18 U.C.A., as to which party was the 
successful party in the arbitration and to receive further 
evidence as to the amount of attorney fees of the successful 
party and make findings as to what should be a reasonable 
attorneys fee in this matter. 
This motion is based upon the Memorandum of Law 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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attached hereto. 
DATED this ) ' day of August, 2001 
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JOHN L. McCOY (2164) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 W. Broadway, Suite #310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-6400 
FAX NO.: (801) 596-2336 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL deGROOT BUILDING SERVICES, 
LLC, Plaintiff , : 
vs. : 
RICHARD T. GALLACHER and R.T. 
GALLACHER INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
: CIVIL NO. 000600252 
: JUDGE: Hilder 
FACTS: 
1. This action is a mechanics lien action based upon 
§38-1-1 et. seq., U.C.A., the defendants moved for arbitration 
in accordance with paragraph 15.8 of the AIA contract between the 
parties and this Court ordered arbitration. 
2. The plaintiff had filed this action for the total 
sum of $9,881.83, interest at 10% per annum, also for attorney 
fees and costs of court to be taxed as costs to the successful 
party pursuant to Section 38-1-18 U.C.A. 
3* After a plenary arbitration hearing of a day and 
one-half, the arbitrator found in favor of the plaintiff on the 
Fiki 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 9 
merits of this claim and that the defendants owed the plaintiff 
the sum of $8,636.43, plus interest at 10% upon a claim asserted 
at arbitration of about $10,000.00. The arbitrator found that 
the defendants owed plaintiff about 86% of the original claim. 
4. The only claims the defendants succeeded on at 
arbitration were minor construction deficiencies corrected by 
defendants' own subcontractors. 
5. Thus, it is clear in this case, based upon the 
findings of fact by the arbitrator, as to the factual and legal 
issues, that the plaintiff succeeded on 86% of its claim. The 
plaintiff was the "successful party" in the arbitration below, 
and is now asking this Court to enter a judgment and decree of 
foreclosure as originally requested in its complaint. 
6. The plaintiff, as the successful party, under 
Section 38-1-18 U.C.A., mechanics lien law is entitled to 
reasonable attorneys fees as a matter of law to be taxed as costs 
in this action. 
7. The arbitrator made no finding that either party 
was the successful party in the arbitration; but ruled that each 
party should bear its own attorneys fees. 
8. The arbitrator may have regarded an the award of 
attorneys fees as beyond his powers, as the contract providing 
for arbitration made no provision for attorney fees. 
9. The arbitrator made to findings as to the contract 
rate of interest provided by the contract; despite the clear fact 
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that the contract (exhibit 1) signed by the parties provided at 
Article 9.2 that interest "as noted on bottom of invoice" would 
be charged on payments due and unpaid. 
10. The invoices sent thereafter to the defendants all 
had the following language at the bottom: 
Mterms: invoices are due and payable upon receipt 
invoices not paid within the days after date of invoice 
will be charged 2.5% per month interest." 
11. Instead of making any findings as to the above 
subject matter, the arbitrator simply found that the interest 
rate on the money found due upon these invoices was 10 % rather 
than the contract rate to which the parties had agreed. 
ARGUMENT: 
ATTORNEY FEES: 
Section 38-1-18, U.C.A., provides that in any action 
brought to foreclose a mechanics lien, ...MXthe successful party 
shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys fee to be 
fixed by the Court, which shall be taxed as costs in the 
action.'" (Emphasis added). 
The arbitrator found at page 2 of his findings that the 
parties stipulated that the claimant (deGroot) timely recorded 
the mechanics lien and that a copy was sent to the respondents 
(Gallacher) pursuant to law. 
Plaintiff proceeded to prove its case before the 
arbitrator and on an approximate claim of $10,000.00, the 
arbitrator awarded deGroot the sum of $8,636.43 by detailed 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
w 
findings. 
In any event, deGroot (plaintiff) was awarded roughly 
85% of the amount originally claimed. The terms of Section 38-1-
18, U.C.A., are clear and are mandatory in that a "successful 
party shall" (emphasis added) be awarded attorneys fees by the 
Court to be taxed as costs. 
Perhaps it was the language "by the court" which caused 
the arbitrator not to rule on this issue. In addition, these 
fees by statute are to be assessed as costs, not ordinarily done 
by an arbitrator, but usually awarded by a court pursuant to the 
terms of the statute. 
This case is not a complicated case, as can be seen 
from the arbitrator's findings and counsel's affidavit for 
attorneys fees. Plaintiff believes that findings can be made 
therefrom that the plaintiff was the successful party and that 
those fees totaling $7,385.00 shall be taxed as costs. 
The attorneys fees are a substantial factor in this 
case; however, the defendant by his choice of insisting on 
arbitration and the relentless defense of this matter, has caused 
the plaintiff to incur these fees. When such is the case, the 
prevailing party is entitled to those fees reasonably incurred, 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.d. 985 (Utah 1988). 
While it may be argued that the arbitration award 
should not be modified, the arbitrator never made a finding as to 
who was the successful party under Section 38-1-18, U.C.A. It is 
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necessary in a mechanics lien that such a finding be made, 
"Parties contemplating arbitration must be 
assured that the arbitrator will proceed according 
to established standards... a policy that refuses 
to overturn an arbitration award that has clearly 
departed from governing standards established at 
the outset will in the long run simply discourage 
other prospective litigants from submitting their 
disputes to arbitration." Pacific Development v. 
Orton, 420 UAR 3 2001 Ut. 36 (Utah 01). 
If this court does not feel that making findings 
pursuant Section 38-1-18 is proper for this court, then this 
court should remand this matter to the arbitrator who heard this 
matter to make findings of which party was the successful party 
and to receive evidence as to the amount of attorneys fees 
incurred by the successful party and the reasonableness of those 
fees pursuant to Section 38-1-18, U.C.A. 
INTEREST: 
For some unexplained reason, the arbitrator made no 
findings as to the contract rate of interest, but simply made the 
finding the plaintiff was only entitled to interest at the rate 
of 10% per annum. 
Utah law, for many years has provided that the parties 
to a contract may agree to a rate of interest. Section 15-1-1, 
U.C.A. provides: 
M(l) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon 
any rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any 
money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of 
their contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a 
different rate of interest, the legal rate of interest 
for the loan or forebearance of any money, goods or 
chose in action shall be 10% per annum." 
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In this case, it was undisputed that the parties signed 
a contract which referred to the plaintiff's invoice as to the 
rate of interest for unpaid invoices. It was further undisputed 
that the defendant received these invoices thereafter without 
objection as to the interest rate expressed thereon, and that the 
rate of interest on all of those invoices was 2.5% per month. 
There are no findings that the above method of 
referring to another document was incorrect, nor should any such 
finding be made as our Supreme Court has ruled that the 
establishment of interest rates by reference is legal and should 
be upheld, Zions First National Bank v Rocky Mountain Irr, 931 
P2d 142,(Utah 1997). Indeed it is not unusual today to have a 
contract or promisory note refer to a rate or an interest index 
as to the rate of interest. 
It is the plaintiff's position that the rate of 
interest as to the unpaid invoices referred to in the 
arbitrator's findings and the amounts of interest due upon 
plainiff's invoices found to be unpaid by the arbitrator are 
mathematical computations and can be done by this court. 
However, if the court wishes, this issue, also can be referred 
back to the arbitrator to make further findings as to whether or 
not the contract signed by the parties provides as set forth 
above and the rate of interest shown upon the invoices was. 
However, plaintiff believes that there is no dispute of fact that 
the contract was signed and that it refers to the invoices for 
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the rate of interest and that the invoices provide for 2.5% per 
month. Still such a decision is up to the court, as the 
arbitrator failed to make findings on this issue and such 
findings are necessary to clarify a part of the award as set 
forth in (c) of Section 78-31a-13 or any of the grounds set forth 
in Section 78-31a-15. 
SUMMARY 
As set forth in the Orton case, Supra., for the 
arbitration system to work, established standards must be 
followed. The right to have findings made as to who was the 
successful party, and the enforcement of the plain terms of a 
signed agreement between the parties are a part of those 
standards. These deviations from those requirements must be 
corrected by this court or remanded to the arbitrator for 
correction. 
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2001. 
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JOHN L. McCOY (2164) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 W. Broadway, Suite #310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-6400 
FAX NO.: (801) 596-2336 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL deGROOT BUILDING SERVICES, : 
LLC, Plaintiff , : 
vs. : 
RICHARD T. GALLACHER and R.T. : 
GALLACHER INVESTMENTS, LLC., 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM 
OF PLAINTIFF 
: CIVIL NO. 000600252 
: JUDGE: Hilder 
DeGroot replies to defendants opposition memorandum as 
follows: 
At arbitration, the only document providing for 
arbitration before the arbitrator was the agreement of May 24, 
1999, between the parties agreeing to arbitration. This 
agreement which is attached to plaintiff's motion for judgment 
and for attorneys fees herein, made no provision as to attorneys 
fees. Plaintiff believes that this is the reason that the 
arbitrator found that both parties would bear their own attorneys 
fees, as the agreement was silent as to that issue. The power of 
an arbitrator is limited by the agreement providing for 
arbitration. Buzas v. Salt Lake Baseball, 925 P2d 941 (Ut 1996), 
Swift Industries, Inc. v. Botany Industries, 466 F 2d 1125, 1131 
1 
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(3rd Cir. 1972), thus, it is apparent that the arbitrator had no 
power to award attorneys fees. 
More importantly, Gallacher makes the argument that 
because the matter of attorneys fees was submitted by the parties 
to the arbitrator, that such action, indeed placed the matter of 
attorney fees before the arbitrator. The Orton case cited in the 
memorandum of plaintiff was accepted for certiorari by the Utah 
Supreme Court, and on appeal, the Court reversed that part of the 
decision by the Court of Appeals that the arbitration agreement 
could be modified and expanded by the parties by bringing in 
evidence outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. On the 
contrary, the Court held that an arbitration agreement cannot be 
so modified except by a written agreement signed by the parties 
explicitly so providing. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Appeals and held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority when 
he dealt with issues and evidence not covered by the original 
agreement of the parties. A copy of the case is attached for the 
convenience of the court. 
In the instant case, attorneys fees are not provided 
for in the original agreement between the parties, thus any 
reference to them by the arbitrator was beyond the powers of the 
arbitrator, and the fact that the parties orally submitted the 
matter of attorneys fees to the arbitrator did not expand the 
jurisdiction as to attorney fees beyond the time of the written 
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agreement signed by the parties, Pacific Development v. Qrton, 
420 UAR 3 (UT 2001). 
The arbitrator never made a finding as to who was the 
"successful party", under Utah Mechanics lien law, but awarded 
the plaintiff approximately 85% on the merits of its original 
claim. The only claim of defendants allowed by the arbitrator 
was an offset of $745.90. Utah case law is consistent in granting 
attorneys fees in mechanics lien cases to either party who 
succeeds on the merits of their case. Bailey-Allen Co. Inc. v. 
Kurzet, 876 P2d 421 (Ut App 1994). The Court of Appeals in 
Kurzet reversed the trial court denial of attorney fees as an 
abuse of discretion and remanded for a determination of the 
amount of those fees under the guidelines established in Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P2d at p. 989, as the plaintiff has 
asked this court to determine fees in the instant case. 
How could reasonable minds differ as to whether deGroot 
was successful on the merits of this claim? The defendant in 
Bailey-Allen, Supra, only won a dismissal of a mechanics lien and 
bond law claim and nothing more, yet it was a breach of 
discretion under Utah law for the trial court to not award the 
defendant attorneys fees. For an example of how successful 
deGroot was, page 11 of Gallacher's counsel's closing memorandum 
to the arbitrator is attached hereto showing that if the 
arbitrator found for Gallacher on all of the claims presented, 
3 
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Gallacher would still owe deGroot the sum of $832.47. Yet, 
nowhere in these proceedings or in the arbitration did Gallacher 
make any offer of settlement or motion to enter judgment in favor 
of deGroot for any sum whatsoever. Instead Gallacher fought this 
claim every step of the way and even though his own calculations 
show that he owed deGroot money on this job, Gallacher now claims 
that no liability exists as to the defendants for the attorneys 
fees necessary to bring this case to a conclusion, despite the 
fact that the entitlement to such fees is clearly and mandatorily 
set forth by statute. 
Defendants argue that the relief sought by plaintiff in 
its motion is beyond the powers of this Court under Section 78-
31a-14(l)(c). Under the ruling in Orton, such is simply not the 
case. Just the opposite is true; that the arbitrator exceeded his 
powers under Section 78-31a-14 to rule on attorneys fees because 
the arbitration agreement of the parties made no provision for 
such fees. On the other hand, Section 38-1-18, U.C.A., provides 
that this court, not some other finder of fact shall award 
attorneys fees to the successful party to be taxed as costs. 
This procedure has been followed before by a Utah Court 
under arbitration. See Cellcom v. Systems Communication 
Corp., 939 P2d 185 (Utah App. 1997) where an arbitration 
agreement did deal with attorneys fees, but the parties never 
followed that agreement, instead the claimant filed a mechanics 
4 
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lien and claimed attorney fees under Section 38-1-18 and the 
Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court for a determination 
of those fees under Section 38-1-18 U.C.A. 
In fact, it appears that Section 78-31a-15 U.C.A is 
closer to providing the court with the powers to deal with this 
situation where it provides a court with the power to modify an 
arbitration award where: 
"(b) the arbitrators' award is based on a matter not 
submitted to them, if the award can be corrected 
without affecting the merits of the award upon the 
issues submitted/" 
Under the holding and rule in Orton, the issue of 
attorneys fees was not properly before the arbitrator in the 
instant case because the agreement was silent. It is obvious 
that the award can be corrected without affecting the merits of 
the portion of the award correctly submitted to the arbitrator. 
However, other states, with similar arbitration 
statutes to Utah have concluded that where an arbitration 
agreement in fact provided for attorneys fees to the "prevailing 
party", and the arbitration award found on the merits against a 
claimant, but found that the parties should bear their own 
attorneys fees, that such a finding was error under a Washington 
statute which provided as follows: 
"In any of the following cases the court shall 
after notice and hearing make an order vacating 
the award, upon the application of any party to 
the arbitration: 
5 
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"The policy which encourages arbitration would be 
undermined if contracting parties perceived that 
lawful contractual provisions, negotiated and 
expressly agreed upon, could be ignored by the 
arbitration tribunal." 
Moreover, Lacey regarded the right of a prevailing 
party to attorneys fees a serious right of a party to which the 
arbitrator had been ordered to address and had ignored, that the 
court ordered that a new arbitrator be appointed, (p.716) 
The Lacey court then vacated the lower court 
affirmance of the arbitrator award that each party bear its own 
attorneys fees and remanded the case with directions to the lower 
court to choose a new arbitrator for the determination of the 
amount of attorneys fees. 
Gallacher argueS that Buzas v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 
P2d 941 (Utah 1996) supports their position that the arbitrators 
award cannot be changed by this court; however, at p. 947, the 
Buzas court, citing previous Utah cases, cites the general rule 
that an arbitration award will not be disturbed by a court "as 
long as the proceeding was fair and honest and the substantial 
rights of the parties were respected". (Emphasis added). The 
right of a successful party to attorney fees mandated by a 
statute is one of those "substantial rights", see Kurzet Supra. 
Furthermore at p. 950 the Buzas court observed the rule that an 
arbitrator may be found to have exceeded his authority if the 
award is "without foundation in reason and fact," sometimes 
7 
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referred to as the "irrationality principle." The court cited 
with approval an Alaska case defining the irrationality principle 
as "whether reasonable minds could agree that ... [the award] was 
not possible under a fair interpretation of the evidence." 
Anchorage Medical Clinic v. James, 555 P2d 1320, 1323 (Alaska 
1976) (ID. p. 950). 
Thus, it is apparent that the arbitrator in the instant 
case did not have the power to award or not award attorneys fees 
to either party under the contract providing for arbitration. 
There is no doubt that deGroot was the successful party on the 
merits of this case before the arbitrator and that Section 38-1-
1., U.C.A. provides that in such a case, this court shall award 
the successful party attorneys fees to be taxed as costs. 
INTEREST: 
The only invoices in the record in the arbitration 
hearing were invoices bearing the rate of 2.5% per month. 
DeGroot has never made any claim for the service charges or 
transaction fees. The fact that deGroot may have sent invoices 
to Gallacher's lender who was not a party to the agreement should 
affect the contract of the parties which was clear that 
statements not paid would bear interest as set forth on the 
invoices. The invoices submitted in evidence provided for 2.5% 
interest per month. A copy of invoice R-6 is attached for the 
court's examination. The rate of interest specified in a 
8 
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contract should be awarded as a matter of right, 45 AM Jur 2d 43, 
Section 21. It is simply not rational to, in a cost plus 
contract to put upon a contractor the burden of promptly paying 
his workers, suppliers and subcontractors and where the contract 
refers to the invoices and the interest rate of 2.5% per month is 
placed on the invoices sent to the owner, to change that rate to 
10% because a bank who had the construction loan, not a party to 
the contract, was sent invoices which were silent as to the 
interest rate. 
SUMMARY: 
The Courts have a vested interest in seeing to it that 
the law is in fact followed by arbitrators. If the substantial 
statutory or contract right of parties can be totally ignored by 
an arbitrator, parties will refuse to arbitrate, thus causing 
increased burdens on the court system. 
Attorneys fees and the contractual rate of interest are 
provided for by Utah law. These are substantial rights and not 
subject to being ignored by trial courts or arbitrators. The 
court has the power to enforce those rights without disturbing 
the merits of the arbitrator's award. 
DATED this 20th day of August, 2001. 
.ttorney for 
C/ 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT, L.C., 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
Eric ORTON, dba Orton Excavation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 990744 
FILED: 04/24/01 
2001 UT36 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Steven L. Hansen 
ATTORNEYS: 
Scott L. Wiggins, Mark E. Arnold, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff 
Richard D. Bradford, Kim H. Buhler, Provo, for 
defendant 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
DURRANT, Justice: 
[^1 We granted a writ of certiorari to review a court 
of appeals decision affirming the district court's 
confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of Orton 
Excavation. Orton served as a subcontractor on a real 
estate project developed by Pacific Development, 
L.C. A dispute arose over the amount Pacific owed 
Orton for work performed, and the parties entered 
into a written arbitration agreement that described the 
scope of their dispute by reference to a single plat of 
land. The arbitrator made rulings with respect to two 
plats of land upon which Orton had performed work. 
Orton sought confirmation of the award in the district 
court, and Pacific filed a motion to vacate or modify 
the award on the ground that the arbitrator had 
exceeded his authority by ruling on both plats and 
had manifestly disregarded legal authority pertaining 
to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit 
in the contract. The district court confirmed the 
award, and Pacific appealed on the same grounds it 
had raised before the arbitrator and the district court. 
The court of appeals affirmed. We affirm in part and 
over a Mechanics' Lien filed against 
Riderwood Village, Plats B & C . . . . [The 
parties] acknowledge that the issues relating 
to the above-referenced Plat B of Riderwood 
Village have been resolved, and that, 
I therefore, the arbitration will focus on the 
remaining issues of the dispute, those which 
relate to Plat C, thereby resolving all 
remaining issues in the case. 
The arbitration took place in 1997. Despite the 
language stating that only Plat C issues remained 
unresolved, both parties presented some evidence 
relating to Plat B. The arbitrator rendered an interim 
decision with respect to both Plat B and Plat C. 
Pacific moved for reconsideration, arguing that the 
arbitrator had exceeded his authority by deciding Plat 
B issues and by failing to apply the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in his Plat C decision. The 
arbitrator supplemented and clarified the reasoning 
supporting his decision but ultimately rejected 
Pacific's motion and issued a final arbitration award 
relating to both plats. 
1[3 Orton sought confirmation of the arbitrator's 
award in the district court pursuant to Section 
78-3 la-12 of the Utah Code. Pacific responded by 
filing a motion to vacate or modify the award. Pacific 
argued that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority 
by including Plat B in the award. Pacific also argued 
that the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the law 
by refusing to apply the doctrine of good faith and 
fair dealing to offset Orton's purportedly excessive 
use of fill material in its work on Plat C. 
[^4 The district court rejected these arguments and 
confirmed the arbitrator's award. Pacific appealed, 
renewing the arguments it had presented to the district 
court. The court of appeals affirmed. See Pacific Dev.. 
L.C. v. Orion, 1999 UT App 217,1|20, 982 P.2d 94. 
With respect to Pacific's claim that the arbitrator 
exceeded the scope of his authority, the court of 
appeals reasoned that Pacific and Orton, by "their 
conduct and mutual consent, submitted Plat B issues 
for resolution, expanding the scope of the arbitrator's 
jurisdiction." Id. ^[12. The court of appeals also 
rejected Pacific's contention that the arbitrator had 
manifestly disregarded the law by refusing to apply 
an offset based on the doctrine of good faith and fair 
dealing. See id. 1J16. 
I ANALYSIS 
T|5 On certiorari, Pacific renews the arguments it 
presented unsuccessfully to the district court and the 
court of appeals. Specifically, Pacific maintains that 
(1) the arbitrator improperly ruled upon a dispute that 
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court faced with a motion to vacate or modify an 
arbitration award is limited to determining whether 
any of the very limited grounds for modification or 
vacatur exist." Id. at 947. On appeal, the appellate 
court should '"grant no deference to the district court's 
conclusions [of law] but review them for 
correctness.'" Id. at 948 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Devore v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 
1246, 1251 (Utah 1994)). On certiorari, we likewise 
review the decision of the court of appeals for 
correctness, but further limit our review to the scope 
of the issues considered by the court of appeals. See 
Wall, 1999 UT 33, f4, 978 P.2d 460. 
1)7 Orton brought its action for confirmation of the 
award in the district court pursuant to the Utah 
Arbitration Act, Section 78-3la-12 of that Act 
requires the court to "confirm the award unless a 
motion is timely filed to vacate or modify the award." 
Pacific timely moved, under Section 78-3 3 a-14( 1), to 
modify or vacate the portion of the arbitrator's award 
pertaining to PlatB. Section 78-31 a-14(1) in pertinent 
part provides: "Upon motion to the court by any party 
to the arbitration proceeding for vacation of the 
award, the court shall vacate the award if it appears: 
. . . (c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers . . . ."2 
Both of Pacific's arguments rely upon this ground as 
a basis for overturning the arbitrator's decision.3 We 
address them in the order stated above. 
I. THE ARBITRATOR'S CONSIDERATION 
OF PLAT B ISSUES 
1J8 The written arbitration agreement provided that 
"[the parties] acknowledge that the issues relating to 
the above- referenced Plat B of Riderwood Village 
have been resolved, and that, therefore, the arbitration 
will focus on the remaining issues of the dispute, 
those which relate to Plat C, thereby resolving all 
remaining issues in the case." In other words, 
payments for Plat B were not in dispute and, once the 
issues relating to Plat C had been resolved, all 
disputes would be at an end. The only reasonable 
interpretation of the agreement is that Plat B issues 
would not be submitted for resolution by the 
arbitrator. 
T|9 We have previously held that only written 
arbitration agreements are enforceable under the Act. 
See Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796,799-800 (Utah 
1998).4 Further, the written agreement defines the 
scope of the arbitrator's authority. "An arbitration 
award purporting to resolve questions beyond [the] 
jurisdictional boundary [of the agreement] is not 
valid. For a court to find that an arbitrator has 
exceeded his or her delegated authority, the court 
must determine that 'the arbitrator's award covers 
areas not contemplated by the submission 
agreement."' Intermountain Power v. Union Pacific 
R.R., 961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998) (quoting Buzas 
Baseball, 925 P.2d at 949). As noted above, the 
arbitration agreement in this case limited the 
arbitrator's authority to issuing an award for the Plat 
presented evidence relating to Plat B for the sole 
purpose of establishing a course of dealing relevant to 
Pacific's arguments concerning its Plat C evidence. 
Orton responds that Pacific opened the door to Plat B 
issues and that Pacific's own evidence made clear that 
Plat B issues were in dispute. Orton thus contends 
that the parties' course of conduct at the arbitration 
hearing invited and necessitated a modification in the 
scope of that hearing. Neither party alleges an express 
agreement to modify the hearing, either orally or in 
writing The issue we must resolve, nen, is the \tvt\ 
of proof necessary to demonstrate a mutual decision 
by the parties to modify the scope of the arbitration 
originally established by a formal written agreement 
to arbitrate. The court of appeals held that the initial 
written agreement could be modified by implication, 
that is, by the conduct of the parties^in presenting 
evidence relating to a dispute outside the scope of the 
initial agreement. See Orton, 1999 UT App 217, 
^12-13,^982 P.2d 94. We disagree. 
1[il Notwithstanding the fact that an arbitration 
agreement is, in its essence, a contract between the 
parties, it is governed by a statute that imposes 
requirements not found in ordinary common law 
contracts. As prior cases make clear, arbitration 
agreements, unlike ordinary contracts, must be 
contained in a written document setting forth the 
scope of the dispute to be arbitrated. See Percival, 
962 P.2d at 799-800 (holding agreement must be in 
writing to be enforceable under the Act); 
Intermountain Power, 961 P.2d at 323 (holding 
arbitrator's authority limited by scope of arbitration 
agreement); Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 949 (same). 
This requirement at once enhances predictability and 
seeks to ensure that the parties are deliberately 
waiving their substantial rights to judicial review. It 
also seeks to relieve the parties and the judiciary of 
the burden of revisiting disputes that have been 
submitted to binding arbitration. 
\\2 In this regard, we have frequently stated that 
the goal of the Act is to encourage extra-judicial 
settlement of legal disputes. As observed in Buzas 
Baseball"'the Utah Arbitration Act 'reflects 
long-standing public policy favoring speedy and 
inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes.'" 925 
P.2d at 946 (quoting Allred v. Educators Mut. Ins. 
Ass'n, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996)); see also 
Intermountain Power, 961 P.2d at 323. That policy, 
however, would not be furthered by a doctrine that 
simply seeks to affirm the maximum possible number 
of arbitration awards. Parties contemplating 
arbitration must be assured that the arbitration will 
[to established standards that both 
sides (jelrffto^ fair and j ust. To ^ he extent rules that 
govjeTn^ 
TusceptfBTeTio"contested fnterpretationrthe policy of 
promoting arbitration will be advanced because there 
will be fewer opportunities to contest an arbitrator's 
award at the district r.nnrt nr thp o^oiiofo u,r~i A 
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Parties contemplating 
that the arbitration will 
ished standards that both 
t. To the extent rules that 
dered more clear and less 
jrpretation, the policy of 
? advanced because there 
to contest an arbitrator's 
}r the appellate level. A 
arbitration award itself and the memorandum of 
agreement which binds the parties and limits the 
scope of issues to be determined by the arbitration." 
925 P.2d at 946 n.2. Accordingly, the rules governing 
the__arbitration proceeding must be^sjiffident in 
-'Themselves to provide the evidence necessary foFa 
court to either confirm, modify, or vacate an 
^itraloj^'award puTsuanTto the statute. 
fl3 TEe scope of the arbitration is a governing 
standard that is fundamental to the expectations of the 
parties to the arbitration. The parties must know the 
boundaries of the subject rnattei of the dispute 
submitted and the potential liabilities flowing 
therefrom before they are able to intelligently waive 
their rights to submit their disputes to formal 
litigation. And because the authority of the arbitrator 
derives from the arbitration agreement itself, see 
Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 949, it follows that the 
scope of an agreement to arbitrate cannot be modified 
except by proper concurrence of the parties to the 
arbitration. 
f14 The court of appeals concluded that a wri tten 
arbitration agreement may be implicitly modified-
merely"by the paTtielTactions in bringing evidencToT 
matters outside the scopeofjhe agreement. We 
disagree. The decision ot the court of appeals is 
"contrary to the statutory criteria governing arbitration 
and to our decisions construing those criteria. Where 
the statute and our case law have held that arbitration 
agreements must be in writing, the preference for an 
explicit expression of the intent of the parties 
regarding the scope of arbitration is well-established. 
To allow modification of an express written 
agreement by less than a similarly explicit intent 
would simply circumvent the statutory requirements 
and the policies they vindicate. In this case, no 
express written agreement to modify the scope of the 
arbitration has been alleged, let alone proven. We 
therefore reverse and hold that the arbitrator exceeded 
the authority granted to him when he issued an award 
for Plat B. 
II. PACIFIC'S CONTENTION THAT THE 
ARBITRATOR'S AWARD DEMONSTRATED 
A MANIFEST DISREGARD FOR 
APPLICABLE LAW 
1) 15 Pacific also asserts that the arbitrator 
manifestly disregarded the law by refusing to apply 
an offset pursuant to the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in its contract with Orton. The 
contract provided for unit price billing for fill 
materials. Pacific claims that Orton violated the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by using too 
much fill material in its work on Plat C, and that the 
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law pertaining to 
this covenant. However, the arbitrator's decision 
explicitly addressed the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing and found that Pacific had failed to meet 
its burden of proof in showing that Orton had 
manifested bad faith in its use of rill materials Thp 
that Pacific had not met its burden of proving 
Orton wasted material. Without a factual 
basis for Pacific's allegation, the arbitrator 
found no support for Pacific's argument that 
Orton had breached its implied duty of good 
faith. Thus, we conclude the arbitrator did not 
manifestly disregard the law. 
Orton, 1999 UT App 217, «!16, 982 P.2d 94. 
H16 We agree. A party is not entitled to review of 
the correctness of an arbitrator's legal reasoning. 
,,:[M]anifest disregard' is much more than mere error 
as to the law." Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 951. Wc 
therefore affirm the court of appeals on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
1117 We reverse the court of appeals' holding that 
the scope of the arbitration agreement was modified 
to include Plat B issues. The Plat B dispute was 
beyond the scope of the arbitration as set forth in the 
written agreement, and the parties executed no written 
modification of that agreement. We affirm the court 
of appeals' holding affirming the district court's 
confirmation of the arbitrator's award as to the Plat C 
dispute. Pacific's claim that the arbitrator manifestly 
disregarded the law is merely an attempt to obtain 
review of the arbitrator's factual findings on thai 
issue. We remand for modification of the arbitrator's 
award in a manner consistent with this opinion. As to 
Orton's claim for attorney fees, on remand, the district 
court has discretion to award Orton attorney fees for 
defense of its action at all court levels, but only with 
respect to Orton's defense of the portion of the award 
pertaining to Plat C. See Utah Code Ann. §78-31 a-16; 
Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 953-54. 
H18 Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice 
Russon, Justice Durham, and Judge Halliday concur 
in Justice Durrant's opinion. 
Tf 19 Having disqualified himself, Justice Wilkins 
does not participate herein; District Judge Bruce K. 
Halliday sat 
1 Apparently, the underlying contract between the parties 
required them to arbitrate disputes. This fact was mentioned 
in oral argument, although neither party has provided an 
addendum of the relevant contract provision nor cited to 
any portion of the record where it may be found. 
2 The full text of the provision reads as follows: 
Upon motion to the court by any party to the 
arbitration proceeding for vacation of the award, 
the court shall vacate the award if it appears: 
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or 
other undue means; (b) an arbitrator, appointed as 
neutral, showed partiality, or an arbitrator was 
guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of 
any party; (c) the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers; (d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the 
hearing upon sufficient cause shown, refused to 
hear evidence material to the controversy, or 
otherwise conducted the hearing to the substantial 
prejudice of the rights of a party; or (e) there was 
no arbitration agreement between thenarties t.n the. 
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parties. See /(/.Similar in nature is the claim, considered in 
other cases buTnot presented here, that an arbitrator's 
"clecisionTacks any basis in reason or fact and is therefore 
"completely irrational." See id. at 95U; lntermouniain Power 
vrVmoh Pacific R.R., 961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998). 
While both arguments presented in this case turn on 
whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority, we will 
emplovthe shorthand term "manifestdisregard" to'refeTto 
Facitic's argument relating to good faithand fair dealing. 
4"!he result in Jenkins was somewhat complex. Justice 
Stewart's lead opinion stated that although an oral 
agreement could not be enforced under the Act, eouity 
might nonetheless provide a separate ground for 
enforcement. See 962 P.2d at 801-02. Justice Zimmerman 
concurred separately, stating that the law should not be 
"hostile to the enforcement of oral arbitration agreements 
made as part of a larger oral contract." See id. at 802. 
Nonetheless, a majority of the members of the court clearly 
held that only written agreements were enforceable under 
the Act. See id. at 799-800 (Stewart, J...joined by Durham, 
J.); id. at 803 (Russon, J., joined by Howe, C.J., dissenting 
from result allowing potential enforcement of oral 
agreement to arbitrate at equity, but concurring in holding 
that written agreement is required under the Act). The 
dispute in Jenkins over equitable enforcement is not 
implicated in this case, as Orton argues only pursuant to the 
Arbitration Act. 
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BACKGROUND 
\2 Pursuant to authority granted under Utah Code 
Ann. §§59-1- 210, -12-118 (2000), the Commission 
has promulgated rules relating to provisions of the 
Sales and Use Tax Act (Sales Tax Act). See Utah 
Code Ann, §§59-12-101 to -1302 (2000). Acting 
pursuant to two such rules, Utah Code Admin. P. 
R865-19S-33, -62, the Commission directed that 
amounts paid for annual memberships to discount 
vendors such as Costco and Sam's Club are taxable 
under the Sales Tax Act. See Utah Tax Bulletin 33-94 
(1994). Vendor members are allowed to purchase 
taxable property or services at a discounted rate from 
the vendor. Appellants are members of either Costco 
or Sam's Club and have paid sales tax on their annual 
membership fees. 
1(3 Appellants, as class representatives in a class 
action lawsuit, filed a declaratory judgment action in 
district court to challenge the legality of R865-19S-33 
and R865-19S-62 of the Utah Administrative Code. 
Appellants contended the membership fees are not 
taxable under Utah Code Ann. §§59-12-102, 
-103(l)(a), (f) (2000). Upon a motion by the 
Commission, the trial court dismissed Appellants' 
complaint after deciding that it did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction because Article XIII, Section 11 of 
the Utah Constitution gives the Commission original 
jurisdiction. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f4 The issue before us is whether the trial court 
properly dismissed Appellants' complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. We review the trial court's 
determination for correctness. See Schwenke v. Smith, 
942 P.2d 335, 336 (Utah 1997). 
ANALYSIS 
15 Article XIII, Section ll(3)(a) of the Utah 
Constitution states: "The State Tax Commission shall 
administer and supervise the tax laws of the State." 
Id. A limitation on the Commission's power is 
contained in Article XIII, Section 11(5) of the Utah 
Constitution, which states: 
Notwithstanding the powers granted to the 
State Tax Commission in this Constitution, 
the Legislature may authorize any court 
established under Article VIII to adjudicate, 
review, reconsider, or redetermine any matter 
decided by the State Tax Commission . . . 
relating to revenue and taxation as provided 
by statute. 
Id. (emphasis added). The trial court focused on the 
word "decided" in Article XIII, Section 11(5) and 
concluded in a memorandum decision that "it would 
be an unconstitutional infringement for the Court in 
this case to decide these matters in the first instance 
without allowing the Tax Commission the 
opportunity to address the issue." On appeal, the 
Commission argues that prior to seeking judicial 
review of a rule, Article XIII, Section 11(5) requires 
a oartvto brine the issue before the Tomr i iccirm in ' 
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supervision), Mr. deGroot first tried to blame it on the plans, an argument he could not support 
Then he tried to argue that the plans showed a 36 inch tub, but because a 42 inch tub was installed 
it crowded the window. However, review of the plans (C-2, p. 2) showed a 42 inch tub was 
contemplated. Mr. deGroot then claimed that the tub was not installed until after the framing 
was done. This claim was destroyed by Ex. C-5(b), an exhibit that Mr. deGroot did not proffer, 
undoubtably because it referenced the reversed NO CHARGE mentioned above and because 
it referenced the plumber's installation of the tub prior to the framer's final draw. Mr. deGroofs 
position in this matter has been one argument after another, on a fruitless search for supporting 
evidence. 
The arbitrator may recall that several times during the hearing, when mention was made 
of Mr. deGroot's characterization, as shown in Exhibit R-l, that the rock retaining wall was 
complete on October 30,1999, Mr. deGroot said more than once, "We'll have to change that." 
Mr. deGroofs unbridled willingness to change his story to fit his claims is obvious, and should 
not be rewarded. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. deGroofs claim should be reduced as follows: 
PRINCIPAL 
Less: Improper bills 
Retaining wall 
Framing 
Driveway 
Water Line 
$ 10,625.11 
(1,243.03) 
(3,558.71) 
(1,510.90) 
(1,580.00) 
(L900.00^ 
TOTAL DUE S 832.47 
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PAUL de GROOT BUILDING SERVICES, L L C . -2389 WEST DAYBREAKER DR., PARK CITY, UT 84098 
moicEm ) 649-6696 wk/hm 
For. 
(435) 649-3470 fax 
12/01/99 
Matt DeWall - 214 Norfolk, Richard Gallacher - 220 Norfolk, Lance Richards - 226 Norfolk 
Description: Final Billing for Utility Construction Work 
SCRIPTiON 
Dervision, Traffic Control 
TALIN-HOUSETABOR 
H date H Name 
10/29-11/4 Dave 
HdtZlC 
^7.5 
cost IL code | Q 
35.00 
subtotal DC TOTAL | 
262.50 
262.50! 
*>re Concrete Cutting 
jerson Lumber-PT 6x6 for temp, electrical 
rk City Excavation - Final Billing as to Utility Contract 
The following was billed to 214 and 226 but is common for all 3 homes 
Set rocks for water meter box between 226 and 220 
Set rocks for water meter box between 220 and 214 
Set rocks behind house 226 and 220 
Set rocks behind house 220 and 214 
i 
move 4 loads of debrie from 226 that was stock plied arid removed during its excavation @$150 
262.50 
v 59.31 
/ l/.2)#fo,ZBD.0O 
r«V, WJ 2,968.00 
2($T 3,068.00 
2/6 j 623.50 
^ - 1 1,084.00 
600.00 
TAL MATERIAL. SUBCONTRACT & OTHER COSTS 
TAL IN-HOUSE LABOR 
5% BUILDER FEE ON OTHER COSTS ONLY 
)TAL AMOUNT NOW DUE 
12,365.31 
262.50 
1,854.80 
14,482.61 
% HH3 
1/3 to Matt Dewall 4,827.54 
1/3 to Richard Gallacher 
1/3 to Lance Richards 
4,827.54 
4U827.54 
)TAL AMOUNT NOW DUE 14,482.61 
TERMS: INVOICES ARE DUE AND PAYABLE UPON RECEIPT. INVOICES NOT PAID WITHIN TEN DAYS AFTER DATE OF INVOICE WILL BE CHARGED 25% A MONTH INTEREST • 
2% TRANSACTION F E E * $25.00 SERVICE CHARGE. SHOULD COLLECTION BECQUE NECESSARY, THE OJEhn -AGREES TO PAY A U FEES, LIEN W A R G E S AND ATTORNEYS 
FEES, C C * ^ OF W C C E 8 A W TIME 6HEET8 ARE A V A I L S MANY OF THESE ITEMS HAVE ALREADY BEEN PAJD IN YOUR BEHALF. PLEASE PAY PROMPTLY. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR BUSINESS 
YOUR CHECK IS YOUR RECEIPT 
i zo\i 
• e$T of) Kick 
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No, 
JOHN L. McCOY (2164) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 W. Broadway, Suite #310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-6400 
FAX NO.: (801) 596-2336 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL deGROOT BUILDING SERVICES, : 
LLC., Plaintiff , : 
vs. : 
RICHARD T. GALLACHER and R.T. 
GALLACHER INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM 
' 
: CIVIL NO. 000600252 
JUDGE: Hilder 
FACTS: 
1. It is not true that Gallacher has paid the award in 
full- While negotiations have been ongoing, as to the principal 
and interest, Gallacher has never tendered the $250.00 in 
arbitration fees awarded to deGroot. 
2. The plaintiff takes the position that the 
arbitrator, under Orton exceeded his jurisdiction if he made any 
ruling beyond his authority under the arbitration agreement. The 
arbitration agreement was silent as to attorneys fees or any 
rights under the mechanics lien statute. Thus, any part of the 
arbitrator's ruling as to both of these issues other than to say 
that the arbitrator had no authority to rule in any respect as to 
these issues, is beyond the authority of the arbitrator. 
3. The Gallachers, in their reply memorandum believe 
that paragraph 15.8 of the contract, having the following 
language bars the filing of a mechanics lien or the awarding of 
attorneys fees by the following language: 
"15.8 All claims or disputes between the contractor 
and the owner arising out of or relating to the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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contract documents or the breach thereof shall be 
decided by arbitration." 
4. All that this clause does is refer to claim or 
disputes arising out of or related to the contract documents or 
the breach thereof- There is no mention in the contract 
documents of either mechanics liens or attorneys fees or any 
statutory rights. 
5. Gallacher does not dispute the facts set forth in 
paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of deGroot's memorandum, pursuant to Rule 
4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration, thus the following 
are established facts in this case. 
6. Prior to the institution of the instant fore-
closure action, Gallacher was billed by deGroot, he was sent a 
copy of the mechanics lien and a demand letter by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, all of which Gallacher ignored. 
7. Only after being sued in this lien foreclosure 
action, did Gallacher respond in any way, and that was a motion 
to arbitrate. 
8. At no time in this foreclosure proceeding or in the 
arbitration did Gallacher offer to mediate, make any offer of 
settlement or make any offer of judgment even though in the 
arbitration proceeding he admitted that he owed deGroot money. 
9. Instead, Gallacher has persisted in requiring the 
full arbitration of this matter, which is not the "quick, 
inexpensive" resolution of disputes that the American Arbitration 
Association claims that it is. Instead, it has cost deGroot 
$2,720.15 as his one-half of arbitration costs to decide several 
issues, totaling less than $10,000.00 and in addition, paying 
his attorney to represent him. 
A 4 r\ 
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ARGUMENT: 
I 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO MODIFY IS 
SIMPLY TO ASSURE THAT THE DECISION 
OF THE ARBITRATOR CANNOT BE CONSTRUED 
TO AFFECT THE POWER AND DUTY OF THIS 
COURT TO AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES. 
The only intent of plaintiff's motion to modify is to 
make it clear that any part of the arbitrator's decision 
appearing to limit the legal power and duty of this court to 
award attorneys fees is quite clearly beyond the powers of the 
arbitrator. Any other interpretation would be a violation of 
§78-31a-15 (1) (b): "The arbitrator's award is based on a matter 
not submitted to them..." and the ruling by the Supreme Court in 
Pacific Development v. Orton, 2001 UT. 36, 23 P3rd 1035, 1040. 
DeGroot cites Orton for the proposition that an arbitrator cannot 
decide a matter such as a statutory right to attorneys fees never 
mentioned in the original arbitration agreement which is exactly 
what part of the arbitrator's decision could be construed as 
doing. Such a position is not "manifest disagreement" with the 
decision of the arbitrator, as Gallacher argues, it is simply in 
keeping within the above statute and Orton. 
II 
GALLACHER CITES NO CASE LAW TO SUPPORT 
THE POSITION THAT DEGROOT WAIVED HIS 
RIGHTS TO A MECHANICS LIEN AND ATTORNEY FEES. 
Gallachers cite absolutely no cases in Utah or other 
jurisdictions for the proposition that by signing the above 
agreement, deGroot waived his rights to a mechanics lien or 
attorneys fees thereunder. The case law in Utah has been for 
over 100 years, that in order to waive such a statutory right, 
such an agreement must contain language expressly waiving such 
statutory rights. The contract between the parties never once 
mentions mechanics liens, attorneys fees or any statutory rights 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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• • 
in any respect, thus this agreement cannot legally waive 
deGroot's statutory rights to a mechanics lien and attorneys fees 
in this case. 
Gallachers make a great deal of the fact that deGroot 
never resisted their motion for arbitration, DeGroot simply 
wanted a decision by some intelligent decision maker, to get a 
decision and go on. In fact the arbitrator's award has been 
entered for several months. Despite that fact, Gallacher has 
never made an offer to pay it until plaintiff's second motion to 
enter judgment. It is dubious that Gallacher would be concerned 
about paying this long outstanding obligation if a mechanics lien 
and a Lis Pendens had not been filed upon the county records of 
this property. 
The fact is that Gallacher had it completely within his 
power to settle, pay or not to pay or offer a judgment in this 
proceeding or the arbitration. The original contract was a cost 
plus contract to build a residence in Park City to a 4-way 
inspection, an undertaking which could have amounted to over 
$100,000.00. Who controlled the amount involved in litigation or 
arbitration? Gallacher. If the court does not award deGroot his 
attorneys fees incurred in this foreclosure proceeding and the 
arbitration, it is encouraging litigants, as Gallacher upon a 
$10,000.00 bill to say "sue me" or "arbitrate", because they 
know that it is not economic to litigate or arbitrate no matter 
how just the cause. 
The policy urged by Gallacher leaves persons in 
deGroot's position, who have, without question, given value to a 
property owner effectively without a remedy. The mechanics lien 
laws were intended to be remedial and enacted to prevent such a 
situation from occurring. Calder Bros, v. Anderson, 652 P2d 922, 
(Utah 1982). Further, Utah courts have refused to defeat a lien 
because of technicalities or nice distinctions. Park City Meats 
v. Comstock Silver Mining Co., 36 Utah 145, 103 P254 (1909). 
The reason for the statutory requirement that an owner 
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be sent a copy of the mechanics lien by certified mail, return 
receipt, requests, is to give that owner an opportunity to offer 
to pay or negotiate a settlement of the claim. If that owner 
refuses to do so after such letter is sent and no settlement 
reached, and the claiming party files an action to foreclose the 
mechanics lien, if that party is successful, they are entitled to 
attorneys fees as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION: 
This court is now duty bound to disregard any part of 
the arbitrator's decision which would infer to the court that 
only the fees for bringing the foreclosure action would be 
awardable. The case law is clear that the arbitration agreement 
did not waive deGroot's rights under the mechanics lien laws. 
DeGroot was clearly the successful party; the arbitration was a 
necessary part of the process to conclude the mechanics lien 
procedure. DeGroot's reasonable fees as shown in the affidavit 
attached to the previous motion to enter judgment should be 
awarded, as well as the further attorneys fees incurrred since 
of March, 2002. 
orney for Plaintiff ~f 
said affidavit was filed. tf. 
DATED this <£ ^ /?2ay 
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Telephone: (801) 355-6400 
FAX NO,: (801) 596-2336 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL deGROOT BUILDING SERVICES, 
LLC,, Plaintiff , 
vs, 
RICHARD T. GALLACHER and R.T. 
GALLACHER INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
MODIFY THE ARBITRATOR'S 
DECISION TO ENTER 
JUDGMENT AND AWARD 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
Civil No. 000600252 
JUDGE: Hilder 
Plaintiff hereby moves the court to modify the 
arbitrator's decision as to attorneys fees, to award a judgment, 
affirming the arbitrator's award of principal and interest due 
from the defendant's to the plaintiff, to award attorneys fees to 
the plaintiff as the successful party in the arbitration 
proceeding and this proceeding. 
This motion is based upon the Memorandum of Law 
attached hereto. Partial evidence of the amount of plaintiff's 
attorneys fees had already been submitted in a previous motion. 
The attorneys fees which have been incurred since that motion 
shall be submitted in seven (7) days. 
DATED this 5th day of March, 2002. 
torney for Pl^irfitiff 
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JOHN L. MCCOY (2164) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 W. Broadway, Suite #310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-6400 
FAX NO.: (801) 596-2336 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL deGROOT BUILDING SERVICES, : 
LLC, Plaintiff , : 
vs. : 
RICHARD T. GALLACHER and R.T. 
GALLACHER INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO ENTER 
JUDGMENT ON ARBITRATOR'S 
: AWARD & MOTION TO MODIFY 
: ARBITRATOR'S AWARD 
: CIVIL NO. 000600252 
: JUDGE: Hilder 
The plaintiff, in support of the motion to enter 
judgment on the arbitrator's award and motion to modify the 
arbitrator's award and to award attorneys fees herewith submits 
the following memorandum: 
1. The arbitrator had previously found upon the 
plaintiff's claim of about $10,000,00, that the defendant owed 
the plaintiff the sum of $8,636.43, plus interest at the rate of 
10% to the date of payment 
2. The matter of attorneys fees has been remanded by 
the Court to the arbitrator to explain his original decision or 
to decide the matter of attorney fees under applicable law. 
3. The arbitrator on the 14th day of February, 2002, 
chose to clarify his original decision, a copy of which is 
attached at Exhibit 1, as to attorney fees, and after referring 
to Section 38-1-17 and other provisions of Utah law that make it 
clear that only a court has the power to award attorneys fees 
under the mechanics lien statute and ruled as follows: 
"The arbitrator concluded, therefore, that any 
attorney's fees to be awarded in the dispute 
fIL £ 0 
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between the parties would be those incurred in 
connection with the court proceeding to foreclose 
the mechanic's lien and that the authority to 
make such an award is reserved to the court." 
4. However, the arbitrator, further made the following 
ruling: 
"Any attorney's fees to be awarded in the 
dispute between the parties would be those 
incurred in connection with the court 
proceeding to foreclose the mechanic's lien..." 
5. In this case, prior to any legal proceedings, in 
addition to being billed by deGroot, Gallacher received a demand 
letter by certified mail, return receipt requested, together with 
the mechanics lien, and thereafter was served with a complaint in 
this proceeding. (Affidavit of plaintiff's counsel). 
6. At no time in these proceedings or the arbitration 
did Gallacher make an offer of settlement, an offer of judgment 
or offer to mediate or otherwise negotiate this matter (see 
affidavit of counsel attached). In one of his memoranda to the 
arbitrator, Gallacher admitted owing deGroot the sum of $863.00. 
(Exhibit 4) 
7. Gallacher insisted on arbitration which required 
deGroot to pay $500.00 to initiate the arbitration, then another 
$2,220.15 to American Arbitration Association to pay one-half of 
the arbitrator's costs. The arbitrator ordered Gallacher to pay 
one-half of the $500.00 fee, but left deGroot to bear one-half of 
the arbitration costs, or the sum of $2,470.15 which was within 
the powers of the arbitrator. (Affidavit of counsel). 
ARGUMENT: 
I 
A PART OF THE DECISION BY THE 
ARBITRATOR SHOULD BE MODIFIED. 
The decision of the arbitrator, so far as it appears to 
decide any issues as to attorney's fees to be decided by this 
court must be modified by this court and declared to be beyond 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• 
the powers of the arbitrator. The arbitrator recognized the 
holding in Pacific Development v. Qrton, 2001 Ut. 36, that an 
arbitrator exceeded its authority under Section 78-31a-15, if it 
attempted to decide issues which were not specifically authorized 
to be arbitrated within the four corners of the original 
arbitration agreement* While the arbitrator seemed to recognize 
this principle, a literal reading of the following portion of his 
decision is in direct violation of Qrton, wherein the arbitrator 
ruled: 
"Any attorney's fees to be awarded in the 
dispute between the parties would be those 
incurred in connection with the court 
proceeding to foreclose the mechanic's lien..." 
This part of the arbitrator's "clarification" must be 
stricken, as it appears the arbitrator is ruling that only the 
attorneys fees incurred in the filing of the action to foreclose 
the mechanic's lien case could be awarded to deGroot. Such a 
ruling could be an attempt to limit the amount of attorneys fees 
awardable in this case by the court. This ruling is, on its face 
not authorized under the Arbitration Agreement, and indeed is 
beyond the power of the arbitrator, under Section 38-31a-15(b) 
U.C.A. of the Utah Arbitration Act, to wit, this is a matter to 
be decided by this court in accordance with applicable law, which 
is contained in Section 38-1-1 et. seq. dealing with mechanic's 
liens. 
It is the position of deGroot that attorney's fees 
under the mechanics lien statute are to be awarded not only for 
the filing of the lien and the commencement of this action, but 
also for the attorneys fees required to bring this matter to a 
resolution in the arbitration proceeding. Any portion of the 
ruling by the arbitrator which could be construed otherwise 
should be stricken as under Qrton above, the arbitrator does not 
have jurisdiction and such a ruling is beyond the powers vested 
in the arbitrator, thus, would be disregarded by this court. 
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II 
THE CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES CONTAINS 
NO WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO FILE A 
MECHANICS LIEN OR ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
BE AWARDED TO THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY, 
THESE RIGHTS WERE RETAINED BY DEGROOT. 
Nowhere in the contract of the parties is the matter of 
attorney's fees mentioned in the event of breach by either party 
which applies to this case. Nor is there any language in the 
contract waiving deGroot's rights to a mechanics lien and the 
attorneys fees awardable under the mechanics lien statute. The 
language required in an agreement to waive such rights must be 
expressly made. Doane v. Clinton, 2 Utah 417, (1877) Utah Lexis 
62; see also, 73 ALR 3rd, 1042, 1046. There is no language 
dealing with or limiting deGroot's right as to such issues, 
therefore, the bundle of rights created by Section 38-1-1 for 
contractors who bestow permanent improvements upon land, such as 
deGroot who was owed money from the owner retain all of those 
rights under the terms of the written arbitration agreement in 
this case. 
Under such circumstances, the general rule in the 
United States is that attorney's fees expended during the 
arbitration proceedings are to be awarded under the mechanic's 
lien statute where requested by the prevailing or successful 
party. 53 Am Jur 2d. 445 §463. Sentry Engineering & 
Construction v. Mariners Cay Dev. Corp., 287 SC 346, 338 SE 2d 
631 (1985); Harris v. Dyer, Or. 637 P2d 918 (1981). The policy 
reason given in both cases is that the resolution of the dispute 
between the parties in arbitration is a necessary part of the 
mechanics lien procedure to arrive at the true amount to be 
foreclosed. Further, if attorneys fees under the mechanics lien 
statute are not awarded for this part of the process, litigants 
would not be favorable to submitting their cases to arbitration. 
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In the instant case, the logic of the foregoing cases 
is clearly seen. Gallacher steadfastly refused to make any 
payment upon deGroot's billings which amount to about $10,000.00, 
and thereby forced deGroot to file a mechanics lien to secure 
payment. A demand letter, together with the mechanics lien was 
then sent to Gallacher by certified mail, return receipt 
requested, with no response from Gallacher to settle, mediate 
or arbitrate. DeGroot then filed this foreclosure action and 
served Gallacher, who appeared and moved for arbitration. Still, 
no offer of judgment or any other offer in settlement was made by 
Gallacher in either this mechanics lien case or the arbitration 
proceeding. Counsel for deGroot, prior to requesting 
arbitration suggested that the parties negotiate the matter, 
which was refused; then counsel for deGroot requested mediation 
which was also refused by Gallacherfs counsel. 
The rules of arbitration require a $500.00 fee to be 
paid to institute the arbitration, and the American Association 
of Arbitration then required both parties to advance the sum of 
$2,220.15 to be paid prior to arbitration. The arbitrator 
required written memoranda to be filed by both parties prior to 
the arbitration hearing and then further written memoranda be 
submitted in lieu of oral argument with a reply memoranda to be 
submitted by both parties. Such procedures are expensive. 
In the course of submitting such closing memoranda, 
Gallacher admitted that even by the best calculations of his 
counsel, that he still owed deGroot the sum of $832.47. Never-
theless, Gallacher never once offered any sum as a settlement or 
a judgment in this matter. 
Under such circumstances, arbitration is not 
inexpensive. It is extremely expensive if not totally 
impractical when one is forced to resort to it upon a claim of 
approximately $10,000.00 such as deGroot has had to do here, to 
advance $2,720.15 to AAA, then in addition pay an attorney to 
prosecute both of those actions. 
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In this case, Gallacher had the option of avoiding all 
of the above expenditures by deGroot. He could have made a 
reasonable offer of settlement, mediated or made an offer of 
judgment in either this action or the arbitration proceeding. 
Gallacher deliberately chose not to do so, instead requiring 
deGroot to proceed with the arbitration of this case to its 
conclusion and and to file a previous motion and memoranda to 
this court for the award plus attorneys fees. 
Ill 
THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT 
DEGROOT WAS THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY 
AND ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES 
FOR THIS ACTION AND THE ARBITRATION. 
This court should make a finding as to who was the 
"successful party", under Section 38-1-17, Utah Mechanics lien 
law. The arbitrator awarded the plaintiff approximately 85% on 
the merits of its original claim. The only claim of defendants 
allowed by the arbitrator was an offset of $745.90. Utah case law 
is consistent in granting attorneys fees in mechanics lien cases 
to either party who succeeds on the merits of their case. 
Bailey-Allen Co. Inc. v. Kurzetr 876 P2d 421 (Ut App 1994). The 
Court of Appeals in Kurzet reversed the trial court denial of 
attorney fees as an abuse of discretion and remanded for a 
determination of the amount of those fees under the guidelines 
established in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P2d at p. 989, 
upon the same guidelines as the plaintiff has asked this court to 
determine fees in the instant case. 
How could reasonable minds differ as to whether deGroot 
was successful on the merits of this claim? The defendant in 
Bailey-Allen, Supra, only won a dismissal of a mechanics lien and 
bond law claim and nothing more, yet it was a breach of 
discretion under Utah law for the trial court to not award the 
defendant attorneys fees. For an example of how successful 
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deGroot was in the arbitration, page 11 of Gallacher's counsel's 
closing memorandum to the arbitrator is attached hereto showing 
that if the arbitrator found for Gallacher on all of the claims 
presented, Gallacher would still owe deGroot the sum of $832.47. 
Yet, nowhere in these proceedings or in the arbitration did 
Gallacher make any offer of settlement or motion to enter 
judgment in favor of deGroot for any sum whatsoever. Instead 
Gallacher fought this claim every step of the way and even though 
his own calculations show that he owed deGroot money on this job, 
Gallacher now claims that no liability exists as to the 
defendants for the attorneys fees necessary to bring this case to 
a conclusion, despite the fact that the entitlement to such fees 
is clearly and mandatorily set forth by statute. 
This procedure has been followed before by a Utah Court 
under arbitration. See Cellcom v. Systems Communication 
Corp., 939 P2d 185 (Utah App. 1997) where an arbitration 
agreement did deal with attorneys fees, but since the parties 
never followed that agreement, the Court of Appeals remanded to 
the trial court for a determination of those fees under Section 
38-1-18 U.C.A. since a mechanics lien had been filed. 
In addition, in the case of Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake 
Trappers, 925 P2d 941, 953, (Utah 1996), the court made the 
comment that a provision of Utah providing for attorneys fees 
N>
 'promote [ed] the public policy of encouraging early payment of 
valid arbitration awards and discourage[ed] non-meritorious 
protracted confirmation challenges'". Likewise, in the instant 
case, the awarding of attorney fees in a case where an amount 
owed was admitted would discourage needless arbitration hearings. 
In other states, with similar arbitration statutes to 
Utah have concluded that where an arbitration agreement in fact 
provided for attorneys fees to the "prevailing party", and the 
arbitration award found on the merits against a claimant, but 
found that the parties should bear their own attorneys fees, that 
such a finding was error under a Washington statute which 
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provided as follows: 
"In any of the following cases the court shall 
after notice and hearing make an order vacating 
the award, upon the application of any party to 
the arbitration: 
• • • 
4. Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers 
or so imperfectly executed them that a final 
and definite award upon the subject matter was 
not made,/' 
The Washington Court of Appeals in Agnew v. Lacey Co-ply, 654 P2d 
712, 60 ALR 5th 669, 720, (Wash. App. 1983) held that an 
arbitrator exceeded its powers did not have any discretion with 
regard to entitlement of a prevailing party to attorneys fees, 
except to determine the amount of such fees. 
The Lacey Court, citing the need for parties to be 
confident that the law will be followed by arbitrators, commented 
as follows: 
"The policy which encourages arbitration would be 
undermined if contracting parties perceived that 
lawful contractual provisions, negotiated and 
expressly agreed upon, could be ignored by the 
arbitration tribunal." 
In Lacey, the above language referred to an agreement. 
In the instant case, the language is that of Section 38-1-17 
U.C.A. which makes the award of attorney fees mandatory to the 
successful party. Certainly, if contracting parties perceived 
that their unrelinquished statutory rights are given away in an 
arbitration agreement never mentioning those rights, such parties 
would not be inclined to sign such agreements. 
While the language in Lacey refers to the Arbitration 
Agreement, in the instant case it is important that the attorneys 
fees also incurred in the arbitration proceeding should awarded 
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by this court because only by the expenditure of those fees could 
the foreclosure proceeding be brought to a conclusion. 
CONCLUSION: 
The motion of the plaintiff to modify the arbitration 
decision as to attorneys fees only and affirm the award of 
principal and interest and to award attorneys fees should be 
granted by this court because deGroot never waived any rights 
under the mechanics lien statute including attorneys fees; 
deGroot was the successful party in this foreclosure proceeding 
and the arbitration proceeding, both of which were necessary to 
bring this matter to a conclusion. 
DATED this 5th day of March, 2002. 
torney for Plai 
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION TOIB UNAL 
In the Matter of the Arbitration between 
Re: 81 110 00010 01 TMS 
Paul deGroot Building Services, LLC 
and 
Richard T. Gallacher etal. 
ADMINISTRATOR: Ten M. Salazar 
DISPOSITION OF REFERRAL FOR CLARIFICATION OF AWARD 
I, THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR, having been designated in accordance 
with the arbitration agreement entered into by Paul deGroot Building (hereinafter known 
as "Claimant") and Richard T. Gallacher and Gallacher Investments, L.L.C, (hereinafter 
known as 'Respondent"), and dated May 24, 1999, and having been duly sworn and 
having previously duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, and having 
previously rendered an Award dated July 19, 2001, and in an Order dated November 12, 
2001, Robert KL Hilder, District Court Judge, in the matter of Paul deGroot Building 
Services, Ll.C, Plaintiff, v. RichardT. Gallacher and RT Gallacher Investments, 
LLC, Defendants, Civil No. 000600252, filed in the Third Judicial District Court for 
Summit County, State of Utah,"... referred back to the Arbitrator, Harold C. Verhaarcn, 
Esq., for either clarification of his decision not to award fees, or to amend the judgment 
as he sees fit regarding attorney's fees, under applicable law, and having reviewed and 
considered the memoranda submitted on behalf of the parties relating to the attorney's fee 
issue, I do make the following rulinp and clarification of my earlier decision not to award 
attorney's fees to either party:""" 
The parties concede that the agreement to arbitrate contains no attorney's fee 
provision. It was and remains the conclusion of the Arbitrator that the agreepsnlJo 
aibitr^controls the_scope of the arbitration and the authority of the arbitrator. That 
conclusion is supported by several Utah cases, including Pacific Development v. Orton, 
23 P.3rd 1035 (Utah 2001). Accordingly, absent an attorney's fee provision in the 
parties' agreement to arbitrate, thejirhitrator has no authority to award attorney!sLfees. 
Further, it is the opinion of the Arbitrator that, in any_eventJ.a mechanic's lien foreclosure 
proce^ingj^lsoutside the authority and jurisdiction of an_arbitrator^jt is, by statute,* 
judicSPproceeding. The claim for and right to attorney's f^s~cferivcs from the 
mechanic's lien statute. UTAH CODE ANN. §38-1-18 specifically provides that 
reasonable attorney's fees are to be "fixed by the court." Also, § 38-1-15 provides: "The 
court shall cause the property to be sold in satisfaction of the liens and costs as in the case 
of foreclosure of mortgages . . ." and 38-1-17 specifics that ". . . as between the owner 
and the contractor, the court shall apportion the costs according to the right of the case 
" (Emphasis added.) T h e ^ ^ ^ 
bglHggd^ ipJke dispute between the parties would be those^mcun-^ gyggmection with 
t j ^ g g g ^ ^ mechanic's lien and that the authority tomake such 
a£ award is reserved to the Court. """" * " "— —======---
In all other respects my Award dated July 19,2001, is reaffirmed and remains in full 
force and effect 
SlG^^/M/^^jf^f^ DATE: (&A JS 2**2-
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